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In this brief reaction, I offer some comments on Professor Yackee’s excellent note, Do 
states bargain over investor-state dispute settlement? Or, toward greater collaboration in 
the study of bilateral investment treaties.1 I join his call for more empirical and 
interdisciplinary research in the field of international investment law and I argue 
against perpetrating the quantitative/qualitative divide in empirical legal research 
generally. Qualitative data, when obtained and analyzed in rigorous ways, can be as 
revealing as quantitative analysis. Interviews and other similar data collection strategies 
are very relevant and often an important departure point in every empirical inquiry. 
Hence—when possible— surveys and case studies should be used in complementary ways 
for improving empirical legal studies in international investment law. 
*  *  * 
Professor Yackee is a rising star among the empirical legal community and an 
established scholar in the field of international investment law, with a delightful and 
clear style. In his piece reproduced in this volume, Professor Yackee reminds us of the 
benefits and perils of empiricism in legal scholarship and advocates for greater 
collaboration between lawyers, legal scholars, and social scientists.2  
When it is well done, empirical research may reveal unexpected, often counter-
intuitive relationships that challenge the beliefs and assumptions of legal scholars (e.g., 
the relationship of crime rates and tough laws)3. This type of research may also settle 
normative arguments that scholars have at times spent years arguing for or against (e.g., 
the existence of racial discrimination in death penalty convictions),4 or reject false claims 
about causation between two phenomena (e.g., that more guns yield less crime).5 
However, when done poorly, either by legal scholars without proper methodological 
training, by social scientists with insufficient understanding of the law or the legal field, 
or by scholars lacking both, empirical research may lead to wrong and even potentially 
disastrous prescriptions.6 As Alan O. Sykes—a giant in the field of international 
economic law—once told his class about a seemingly promising empirical paper: some 
 
1. Jason Yackee, Do States Bargain Over Investor-State Dispute Settlement? Or, Toward Greater 
Collaboration in the Study of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 12 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 277 (2013) 
[hereinafter Yackee Dispute Settlement Bargain].  
2. Yackee Dispute Settlement Bargain, supra note 1, at 277. 
3. John J. Donohue III & Stephen D. Levitt, The Impact of Legalized Abortion on Crime, Q. J. ECON. 
379-420 (2001) (discussing the correlation between the legalization of abortion and reduced crime 
rates). 
4. John J. Donohue III, Capital Punishment in Connecticut, 1973–2007: A Comprehensive 
Evaluation From 4686 Murders to One Execution 100 (2013), available at  
http://works.bepress.com/john_donohue/87.  
5. John J. Donohue III, The Final Bullet in the Body of the More Guns, Less Crime Hypothesis, 2 
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 397-410 (2003). 
6. Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2002) (providing a 
critique of empirical legal research). 
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empirical legal studies may show how knowing a little bit of two disciplines can be a bad 
combination.  
As observed by Professor Yackee, scholars interested in legal questions with different 
disciplinary backgrounds often do not interact with each other, let alone with lawyers, 
but they share the goal of deploying empirical evidence to understand legal systems and 
legal behavior.7 Although empirical legal scholars may use different sorts of data, 
different methods of data collection, and different analytic approaches, they all face the 
challenges of empirical research design: identifying research questions, selecting 
appropriate methods for answering those questions, gathering and managing valid data, 
conducting rigorous analyses, and interpreting the results in a way that is faithful to the 
evidence.8 
Professor Yackee reminds us of a very practical way in which those not trained in 
modern statistical methods have the capacity to contribute in meaningful ways to 
empirical research without turning themselves into quants. He does so by showing how 
in creating “measurements,” scholars may hide or decontextualize a phenomenon.  
Similarly, variables good for regression analysis may also hide the complexity of what is 
often referred to as the law in action (i.e., how rules arise and operate in the real world).9 
More importantly, Professor Yackee reminds us that the conversation in empirical 
legal research is not a one-way street: as legal academicians should use the advice of 
social scientists for good, valid, and replicable empirical legal research, social scientists 
should likewise refrain from law-related research without understanding the malleability 
of the law and its instrumental, often strategic use. 10 In other ways, interdisciplinary 
empirical legal research is a two-way or sometimes multiple-way street that leads to 
better understanding of legal systems, legal behavior, and how law is implicated in our 
social life, more generally. 
I couldn’t agree more with this view. Moreover, Professor Yackee’s example is 
convincing and elegant: a dependent variable (the outcome of bilateral investment 
treaties (BITs) negotiations) constructed by two political scientists without deep 
understanding of how litigants perceive and assess dispute settlement choices, how elites 
are involved in negotiation approach treaty drafting, or the historical evolution of 
international investment dispute settlement system, may surely render meaningless 
results regarding the basic underlying mechanism of treaty bargains.11 In this basic 
example, consulting a lawyer at a firm with expertise in the field would have confirmed 
 
7. Yackee Dispute Settlement Bargain, supra note 1, at 281-83.  
8. See generally DEBORAH R. HENSLER, RESEARCH METHODS FOR POLICY ANALYSIS: A PRIMER FOR 
LAWYERS, (2001).   
9. Stewart Macaulay, Wisconsin’s Legal Tradition, Speaking to Benchers before Receiving 
Brazeau Professorship (1994), in 24 Gargoyle, Issue 3, 6-10. 
10. Yackee Dispute Settlement Bargain, supra note 1, at 279. 
11. Id. at 283-87.    
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that having the option of a number of forums tends to be better than no option; asking a 
lawyer at the State Department of the United States would have confirmed that 
alternatives to ICSID are especially important when a country is not a party to the 
ICSID Convention; and asking a member of ICSID’s Secretariat would have helped to 
confirm that decisions such as Klöeckner,12 Fedax,13 or Mafezzini14 have changed the way 
lawyers assess dispute settlement options, or how since Argentina’s disputes, or the 
creation of the Additional Facility, ICSID’s value as a dispute resolution forum has been 
reassessed.15 The example is wonderful because it illustrates—in very simple and 
intuitive terms—the important role of lawyers and legal scholars in quantitative 
empirical research.  
Perhaps where I take a small departure from Professor Yackee’s main point is by 
suggesting that empirical legal studies be defined more broadly. Quants are only part of 
the empirical legal community with whom lawyers and legal scholars can and should 
attempt to collaborate. Qualitative empirical research is as valuable as quantitative 
research, and provides possibilities for giving rich context to legal behavior. Qualitative 
descriptive research methods lend themselves to narrative analyses rather than 
statistical analysis, are well suited to studies that chronicle the design and 
implementation of new programs or negotiations (e.g., legislative histories, process 
evaluations or treaty bargains), and investigate the dynamics of decision-making, conflict 
resolution, and litigation. It is in this area where lawyers and legal scholars, often 
passionate about legal minutia, constantly aware of the strategic use of the law, 
observant of details, may contribute more frequently and perhaps more effectively with 
empirical scholarship. 
 
12. Klöeckner v. Republic of Cameroon: Decision of the Ad Hoc Committee, 1 ICSID REV. FOREIGN 
INV. L. J. 89 (1986) (annulling the awards for reasons seen by many experts as second-guessing 
the reasoning of the tribunal that decided the cases). 
13. Fedax v. Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/3, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, 
¶ 29 (July 11, 1997) (determining that, for the purpose of both the BIT and the Convention, some 
promissory notes purchased by the investor qualified as an investment). 
14. Maffezini v. Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 64 (Jan. 25, 2000), 5 
ICSID Rep. 396 (2002) (confirming that investors, by reference to a most favored nation [MFN] 
clause, might rely on more favorable dispute settlement provisions contained in other BITs when 
compatible with the ejusdem generis principle. In this particular case, Spain had objected to the 
Tribunal’s jurisdiction because the investor had failed to submit the case to the domestic courts in 
Spain for a period of eighteen months before bringing an investment claim as set forth in the 
Argentine-Spain BIT. The Tribunal agreed that the claimant did not have to first submit their 
claims to domestic courts based on the MFN clause in a different treaty, the Spain-Chile BIT.) 
15. See Piero Bernardini, ICSID Versus Non-ICSID Investment Treaty Arbitration, in LIBER 
AMICORUM BERNARDO CREMADES, 159 (Miguel Ángel Fernández-Ballesteros and David Arias, 
eds., 2010) available at http://www.arbitration-icca.org/media/0/12970223709030/bernardini_icsid-
vs-non-icsid-investent.pdf (noting that the limited review and full compliance of the awards, in the 
past considered an advantage of the system, are no longer so evident). 
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In my view, a narrow definition of empirical research may reflect a general trend in 
our contemporary culture to often regard quantitative data as inherently more objective 
than qualitative data, hence a tendency to define quantitative data as “empirical,” and 
qualitative data as not. This is a true trend in legal academia.16 However, the results of 
qualitative empirical research are valuable, and when done well, can be equally 
revealing. 
*   *   *  
The value of qualitative data could be illustrated with the following example. As 
described by Professor Yackee, Professors “Allee and Peinhardt code the strength of ISDS 
provisions (their dependent variable) by noting the dispute settlement to which each BIT 
grants investors access. They also collect a number of independent variables measuring 
concepts related to the strength of home state preferences for strong ISDS, the strength 
of host state preferences for weak ISDS, and the balance of bargaining power between 
home and host states.” 17 From this, it is clear that the authors of the paper started with 
a theory in mind, with—perhaps—minor (or no) input from those involved in negotiating 
BITs (i.e., government representatives and negotiators) from “powerful capital exporters” 
or “weaker capital importers” countries.18 This input could be easily obtained through 
interviews and should have preceded any “Big Data” collection (e.g., categorizing 
outcomes of treaty negotiations). This simple exercise could be key to specify the model (a 
theory about what is causing what), which –at the same time—could impact the 
assessment of the data needed to create the analyzed variables.  
Perhaps due to the methodological training of Allee and Peinhardt (i.e., political 
science) the authors seem to be concerned with a question of geopolitical power, or 
bargaining power. 19 However, let’s assume that the Mexican Chief Negotiator during the 
interviews mentions that after NAFTA the same ISDS provisions (again, their dependent 
variable) are often replicated for “convenience.” The Chief Negotiator explains to the 
interviewee that for the Dirección General de Consultoría Jurídica de Negociaciones 
(Mexican BITs negotiators) it is easier to specialize in one type of treaty model. In other 
words, whether Mexican negotiators are on the “offensive side” (trying to protect Mexican 
investors abroad) or the “defensive side” (preventing the sacrificing of sovereignty to 
ISDS tribunals) the institution has made a policy choice. She also explains that after 
 
16. See, e.g., Jeff Frank Strnad, Should Legal Empiricists Go Bayesian? 9 AM. L. ECON. REV. 195 
(2007) (arguing that empirical legal studies can benefit substantially from Bayesian 
methodologies).  
17. Yackee Dispute Settlement Bargain, supra note 1, at 279 (citing Todd Allee & Clint Peinhardt, 
Delegating Differences: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Bargaining Over Dispute Settlement 
Provisions, 54 INT’L STUDIES Q. 1 (2010)).  
18. Yackee Dispute Settlement Bargain, supra note 1, at 284.  
19. Id. at 285. 
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NAFTA in 1993,20 the same provisions were included in the Mexico-Columbia-Venezuela 
FTA (G3) in 1994 21 and, among many others, the Japan-Mexico FTA in 2004.22 The 
researchers then could assess this key fact and, if the question of bargaining power 
remains of interest, try to include it in the model (for instance, by controlling how prior or 
extremely relevant negotiations may affect prospective outcomes). If that was the case, 
the researcher could specify a model that is less concerned with bargaining power and 
more concerned with diffusion, or how some dispute settlement options spread over a 
network of treaties. 
This is not to say that the research of Allee and Peinhardt is not valuable. It is very 
much so. However, it could be even more valuable if in addition to the laborious 
statistical analysis could be complemented with a case study of an actual treaty 
negotiation (or law in action). It is probably true that bargaining power has something to 
say about treaty outcomes, but how and when is not clear. It is in this that lawyers not 
trained in quantitative methods also could help to improve the ways in which 
methodologically sophisticated social scientists translate legal phenomena into the 
numerical categories and values that make statistical analysis possible.   
While some empiricists may have a preference for some methodological approaches, 
all have the duty not to perpetuate the quantitative/qualitative divide. The decision 
whether to rely on qualitative or quantitative data in an empirical analysis should be 
based primarily on the nature of the questions asked and the analysis intended. And 
when appropriate, a combination of methodologies may be the most powerful. As 
Lawrence Friedman, a pioneer in the field of legal studies once told me: “Qualitative 
analysis without quantitative evidence tends to be entertaining anecdotes; quantitative 
analysis without qualitative data is often blind.”23 
Therefore, whether assisting quants in creative adequate variables or measurements 
that reflect the complexity of the law in action, or designing and executing case studies to 
understand a social phenomenon in context without losing sight of the details and 
nuances that the more standardized survey approach neglects, law professors should 
embrace, and not shy away from empiricism. This is, I believe, an important note to 
motivate more to join the empirical community. 
*  *  * 
 
20. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 605, 694 (1993). 
21. Tratado de Libre Comercio Colombia-México (ACE No. 33) [Free Trade Agreement between the 
United Mexican States for Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela], art. 17-18, June 13, 1994, 
http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/go3/G3INDICE.ASP#Denuncia. 
22. Agreement between Japan and the United Mexican States for the Strengthening of the Economic 
Partnership, art. 79, Sept. 17, 2004, available at 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/latin/mexico/agreement/. 
23. Interview with Lawrence Friedman, Marion Rice Kirkwood Professor of Law, Stanford, CA, (Feb. 
1, 2013). 
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I want to conclude by joining Professor Yackee in his call for more empirical and 
interdisciplinary research in our field. As well pointed in his paper, two lines of research 
dominate the empirical studies in international investment law.24 On the one hand, 
studies that use BITs as independent variables, most commonly, looking at whether the 
treaties cause increases in foreign direct investment. On the other hand BITs as 
dependent variables, or research attempting to explain why states sign BITs. 25 This is, I 
argue, the result of a limited understanding of the goals of modern international 
investment law. 
To increase the possibilities for empirical investigations in the field I’ve argued 
elsewhere that we should understand three different historical motivations for investor-
state arbitration and BITs, or modern international investment law: specialization of 
international investment dispute settlement, de-politicization of inter-state relations, 
and stabilization of economic policy. These three sources are concerned with specific long 
and short-term outcomes, are susceptible to critiques posed by diverse theoretical 
approaches to international law, and therefore, compel scholars to perform new and 
different empirical assessments. Understanding these three sources can substantially 
progress and also shift the focus to new empirical questions in the field.26 
  
 
24. Yackee Dispute Settlement Bargain, supra note 1, at 283-84. 
25. Yackee Dispute Settlement Bargain, supra note 1, at 284. 
26. For a deeper discussion, see Sergio Puig, Recasting ICSID’s Legitimacy Debate: Towards a Goal-
Based Empirical Agenda, 36 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 465 (2013). 
